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By Dr. CLINTON FERNANDES
Confrontations between East Timorese youth and the Indonesian military were not the only source of tensions in the territory.
The Indonesian military had its own internal tensions as well. Brigadier-General Rudolf Warouw, the first commander of Kolakops, had begun cracking down on military corruption and indiscipline and granting greater freedom to civilians through a policy known as Operasi Senyum (Operation Smile). Warouw, who had been commander of Korem 164 from April 1989 to April 1990, had worked closely with Mario Carrascalao, whose term as governor was due to end in June 1992. There was tremendous resentment against Warouw’s anti-corruption measures from within the ranks of the Indonesian military in East Timor. In addition, Indonesia’s special forces commanders were hostile to Warouw, whom they regarded as not hard-line enough against the resistance.
They also wanted to undermine Carrascalao, who was seen as too much of an advocate for the East Timorese people. They would get their chance during the abortive visit of a parliamentary delegation from Portugal in late 1991.
This visit, which had been under negotiation for several years, had its origins in the November 1982 General Assembly resolution whereby the UN Secretary-General was required to ‘initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned’ in order to achieve ‘a comprehensive settlement of the problem.’[1] The issue of East Timor had moved from the General Assembly to the Human Rights Commission and the Special Committee on Decolonisation. In September 1989, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar reported back to the UN that a visit by a parliamentary delegation from Portugal would contribute to an internationally acceptable solution. Indonesia and Portugal then reached agreement on the terms of reference for such a visit, and commenced talks in August 1991 on the practical aspects of the visit. The visit was scheduled to begin on 4th November 1991 but was later rescheduled to 3rd November 1991 by mutual agreement. According to the agreed-upon terms of reference, the delegation would be composed of ‘13 Portuguese parliamentarians, accompanied by 13 Portuguese officials and 10 Portuguese journalists.’ Portugal was to submit all names to Indonesia ‘at least three weeks prior to the commencement of the visit.’ The delegation would be accompanied by ‘12 international journalists, six selected by each side.’ Each side was required to ‘communicate its list of international journalists to the other at least three weeks prior to the commencement of the visit.’
The two sides exchanged lists on 16th October 1991 i.e. three weeks prior to the scheduled start of the visit. Neither side notified the other of any reservations or objections at this stage, and the talks were concluded to all intents and purposes when, on 21st October, Indonesia notified Portugal that it would not accept Portuguese journalists Rui Araujo and Mario Robalo, and Australian journalist Jill Jolliffe because their ‘hostility towards Indonesia’ would not permit the ‘desired objectivity.’ Mediation by the UN Secretary-General’s representative resulted in Indonesia withdrawing its objection to Araujo and Robalo on 23rd October, but not to Jolliffe. Since the delegation was supposed to leave Lisbon on 31st October in order to make the 3rd November arrival date, Portugal advised the Secretary-General’s representative that it needed to know Indonesia’s final position by the night of 24th October for logistical reasons. With no response by Indonesia, Portugal’s ambassador to the UN advised the UN Secretary-General himself on 25th October that the visit could not occur on schedule. The next day, the Speaker of the Portuguese Parliament made a public statement to the effect that the visit would be suspended.
For all the drama surrounding the negotiations, two aspects of the aborted visit should not go unremarked. First, as far as many Portuguese parliamentarians were concerned, the real aim of the visit was to obtain a favourable report on the human rights situation in East Timor in order to allow the Portuguese government to formally accept the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. The pressure being mounted by Portuguese solidarity activists inside Portugal and by other activists elsewhere were something of an embarrassment, and a hindrance to Portugal’s aim to play a role inside the European Union. Portuguese diplomats such as Ana Gomes, with her strong advocacy for East Timor, were an obstacle to this aim. Second, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas and many members of the government were unaware of the extent of East Timorese opposition to Indonesian rule.
Alatas had never believed the confidential reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross, although he received them regularly. He was quite agreeable to the parliamentary delegation’s visit, and argued for it within Indonesia’s cabinet. Unbiased observers could see the human rights abuses and the extent of East Timorese opposition quite clearly. Paul Moore, the retired Episcopal Bishop of New York, visited East Timor in 1989 and 1990, and was sufficiently concerned to write to the New York Times warning that ‘far from tolerating the increasingly vocal dissent of the student movement for self-determination in the territory, Indonesian authorities will respond with a Tienanmen Square-style crackdown.’[2]
From:http://www.amazon.com/Independence-East-Timor-Multi-dimensional-International/dp/1845194284/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1289379550&sr=1-5
[1]General Assembly Resolution 37/30: Question of East Timor, 23 November 1982.
[2] Paul Moore, Indonesia is still oppressing East Timor, New York Times, 22 January 1991.
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